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A RISK-SHARING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL CONTRACTS∗
JUNBEOM LEE† , STEPHAN STURM ‡ , AND CHAO ZHOU §
Abstract. We introduce a two-agent problem which is inspired by price asymmetry arising from funding
difference. When two parties have different funding rates, the two parties deduce different fair prices for derivative
contracts even under the same pricing methodology and parameters. Thus, the two parties should enter the derivative
contracts with a negotiated price, and we call the negotiation a risk-sharing problem. This framework defines the
negotiation as a problem that maximizes the sum of utilities of the two parties. By the derived optimal price, we
provide a theoretical analysis on how the price is determined between the two parties. As well as the price, the
risk-sharing framework produces an optimal amount of collateral. The derived optimal collateral can be used for
contracts between financial firms and non-financial firms. However, inter-dealers markets are governed by regulations.
As recommended in Basel III, it is a convention in inter-dealer contracts to pledge the full amount of a close-out
price as collateral. In this case, using the optimal collateral, we interpret conditions for the full margin requirement
to be indeed optimal.
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1. Introduction. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it has become customary in recent
years for trading desks to make several adjustments in derivative transactions for counterparty
default risk, funding spreads, collateral, etc. For pricing derivatives with the collective adjustments,
many methodologies have been developed by, e.g., [47, 23, 19, 50, 29]. However, it is known that
the fair values derived by the developed methodologies are not fully recouped from counterparties.
This can possibly due to inclusion of funding spread. For traders, if the increased funding costs
are not compensated from the counterparty, it will be losses on the trades. However, considering
the choices of funding in derivative prices is a violation of Modigliani–Miller (MM) theorem. For
MM theorem to be valid, the absence of frictional financial distress costs is required; see [44, 49].
Therefore, considering funding cost/benefit may be justified by market frictions.
Even so, there still remain some puzzles related to the funding adjustment. First, when funding
cost/benefit is accepted, it gives rise to asymmetry of theoretical prices between two contractors
even under the same pricing methodology and parameters. The value fair to one party may not be
fair to the counterparty since funding rates of the counterparty is different from those of the other
party. Second, as asked by [36, 37], if funding cost should be really considered, possibly due to
market frictions, why do banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding costs?
Motivated by the related issues, we introduce a two-agent problem. Instead of using the indi-
vidual fair values, two parties may enter a contract through negotiation by sharing costs, as briefly
mentioned by [43]. We describe the negotiation problem as maximizing the sum of utilities of both
parties and we call this a risk-sharing problem. Then, the risk-sharing framework theoretically
analyzes how the price equilibrium is determined and we can interpret the questions on funding
adjustment by using the derived price. The optimal price from the risk-sharing framework will
depend on the risk aversion parameters and relative negotiation power between the two parties, but
they are not observable in markets. Therefore, the importance of this study is on providing sound
theoretical interpretations for the puzzles on funding difference.
The other part of the solution in the risk-sharing framework is collateral. In recent times, most
OTC derivative contracts are collateralized. There are multiple procedures for the margin, but in
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bilateral contracts, it is general to post variation margin and initial margin. In our model, the
focus is on variation margin which traces mark-to-market exposures. As stated in [13, p.15], “for
variation margin, the full amount necessary to fully collateralise the mark-to-market exposure of
the non-centrally cleared derivatives must be exchanged.” This full collateralization on variation
margin has been settled as a market convention in inter-dealer transactions. On the other hand,
there is no such convention between banks and sovereign or corporate clients. Indeed, it is partly
or not collateralized for contracts between financial firms and non-financial firms. Therefore, the
risk-sharing framework provides the optimal amount of variation margin for the contract between
a financial firm and non-financial firm. Since inter-dealer contracts are governed by regulation in
practice, we interpret the meaning behind the margin requirement.
The optimal collateral in our model is represented by a certain stochastic process. Thus, full
variation margin may not be optimal in general. However, we do not conclude that the convention
is unreasonable. Variation margin is posted on a daily or intra-day basis. If the amount was
calculated by a complicated rule at each time, the amount would be unacceptable for some parties
and this can be a possible cause of conflict. Hence, rather than coming to a sensitive conclusion, we
analyze the situation for the margin requirement to be optimal. The market convention will turn
out to be based on certain conditions on funding cost/benefit considered in derivative prices and
hedging strategy taken by two parties. Especially, we will see later that the full margin requirement
is related to the absence of market friction.
One mathematical difficulty to deal with the risk-sharing problem is that the amount by breach
of contract is given by piece-wise concave functions. Mathematically similar problems were solved
by [24, 15, 14, 51]. In [24], portfolio optimization problems were considered where the agent switches
utilities. They used duality method that cannot be applied to our problem as we cannot impose a
positive constraint for the portfolio. In [15, 14], the piece-wise concave property arose from different
lending/borrowing rates and they solved the optimization problem by using HJB equations. In
their problem, the associated HJB equations had a homothetic property. Moreover, with a mild
assumption that the lending rate is smaller than the borrowing rate, the Hamiltonian became
continuous in their cases. However, in our problem, we deal with two state processes taken by two
utilities, so we cannot make use of a similar approach.
We circumvent the above difficulties by imposing some conditions on funding spread depending
on choices of utilities. For the funding spread, we assume that the lending and borrowing rates are
the same for each party. To be more precise, the two parties fund themselves on their own funding
rate which may not be the same as OIS rate, but the lending and borrowing rates are the same.
Moreover, the funding costs/benefits for delivering collateral of one or both parties will be ignored
for characterization of the optimal solution. More precisely, we will examine two cases. First, we
will consider two risk-averse agents whose funding rates for delivering margin are OIS rate. Second,
we will also consider one risk-averse agent and one risk-neutral agent, and in this case, the funding
rate of the risk-neutral agent does not need to be OIS rate. To streamline this paper, we mainly
deal with the two risk-averse agents in main sections and report the second case in Appendix C.
This funding condition can be understood that the party is an entity which invests the capital
without or with a small leverage, or the party can post collateral with secured funding. Even though
the secured funding for variation margin is not so general, some realistic cases are discussed by [3].
In addition, This setup on funding spread can be partly justified by the results in [42] which showed
that, in many classes of derivatives, hedgers do not need to switch funding state between lending
and borrowing positions. In particular, it is guaranteed that if a hedger does not enter borrowing
state and the lending rate is same as OIS rate, we can ignore the funding impacts.
In our model, we include default risk, funding spread, and collateral. We consider incomplete
markets that hedgers cannot access to assets for hedging default risk such as bonds and CDSs. The
reference filtration is generated by a Brownian motion. The mark-to-market exposure is calculated
as clean price which is the classical risk-neutral price without default risks and funding spread.
Moreover, for risk-averse agents, we consider exponential utilities. For simplicity, we consider non-
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incremental cash-flow in main sections and the incremental effect is discussed together with the
case of a risk-neutral agent only in Appendix C. Then, this paper is organized as follows.
In section 2, the risk-sharing problem is introduced. We start from defining a filtration and
making an assumption on default intensities in subsection 2.1. Before giving the details, we explain
our motivation with a simple model in subsection 2.2. Then we describe cash-flow which are
determined by dividends, margins, and close-out amount. Both parties entering the contract will
have a portfolio given in subsection 2.3 depending on the cash-flow. The introduced risk-sharing
problem is maximizing the sum of utilities of discounted portfolio values at termination of the
contract. In subsection 2.4, the original form of the risk-sharing problem is reduced so that it is
represented on the reference filtration. Then we define admissible sets more precisely with this
reduced problem. We mainly deal with the reduced problem in this paper. In section 3, we define
a dynamic version of the main problem, and optimal collateral is characterized. Then given the
optimal collateral, we derive a condition to find an optimal price in section 4 and examples are
given in section 5.
2. Modeling.
2.1. Mathematical Setup. We consider two parties entering a bilaterally cleared contract.
We call the two parties “Agent A” and “Agent B”, respectively. In what follows, an index A (resp.
B) is used to stand for the Agent A (resp. Agent B). We consider a probability space (Ω,G,P) with
physical probability P and let E be the expectation under P. For i ∈ {A,B}, we define non-negative
random variables τ i on (Ω,G,P) such that P(τ i = 0) = 0 and P(τ i > t) > 0, for any t ≥ 0, to
represent default times of the agents. We let
τ := τA ∧ τB , τ¯ := τ ∧ T,
where T > 0 is the maturity of a certain derivative contract. We denote by (Wt)t≥0 a d-dimensional
standard Brownian motion under P. The reference filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 is the usual natural
filtration of (Wt)t≥0, and the full filtration G is defined as
G = (Gt)t≥0 =
(
Ft ∨ σ
({τ i ≤ u} : u ≤ t, i ∈ {A,B}))
t≥0
.
Then, we consider a filtered probability space (Ω,G,G,P). Note that for any i ∈ {A,B}, τ i is a
G-stopping time but may fail to be an F-stopping time. Unless stated, every process is a (P,G)-
semimartingale. As a convention, for any G-progressively measurable process (ut)t≥0 and (P,G)-
semimartingale (Ut)t≥0,
∫ t
s us dUs =
∫
(s,t] us dUs, where the integral is well defined. In addition, for
any G-stopping time θ and process (ξt)t≥0, we denote
ξθ· := ξ·∧θ,
and when ξθ− exists, denote ∆ξθ := ξθ − ξθ−. For i ∈ {A,B}, t ≥ 0, we also let
Git := P(τ
i > t|Ft) and Gt := P(τ > t|Ft).
The following assumption stands throughout this paper.
Assumption 2.1. (i) (Gt)t≥0 is non-increasing and absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure.
(ii) For any i ∈ {A,B}, there exists a process hi, defined as
hit := lim
u↓0
1
u
P(t < τ i ≤ t+ u, τ > t|Ft)
P(τ > t|Ft) ,
and (M it )t≥0 :=
(
1τ i≤t∧τ −
∫ t∧τ
0
his ds
)
t≥0
is a (P,G)-martingale.
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We denote h := hA + hB. By (i) in Assumption 2.1, there exists an F-progressively measurable
process (h0t )t≥0 such that
h0t = lim
u↓0
1
u
P(t < τ ≤ t+ u|Ft)
P(τ > t|Ft) ,
and (Mt)t≥0 :=
(
1τ≤t−
∫ t∧τ
0 h
0
s ds
)
t≥0
is also a (P,G)-martingale. When τA and τB are independent
on F
h∆ := h− h0 = 0.
In general, it is not the case. Moreover, by (i) in Assumption 2.1 and [27, Corollary 3.4]), τ avoids
any F-stopping time. In other words, for any F-stopping time τF,
P(τ = τF) = 0.(2.1)
Remark 2.2. It is worth discussing the meaning of the item (i) in Assumption 2.1 in view of both
modeling and mathematical aspects. Without the assumption, G is only (P,G)-supermartingale,
thus, by the Doob-Meyer decomposition, there exist a (P,G)-martingale ν and non-increasing
process υ such that G = ν + υ. Therefore, assuming G is non-increasing is equivalent to setting
ν = 0, i.e., we ignore some parts of random effects in default times for mathematical simplic-
ity. In addition, the condition (i) is equivalent to the statement that for any F-martingale ξ, the
stopped process ξτ is a G-martingale, see Proposition 3.4 in [33]. Thus, the condition is close to
(H)-hypothesis.
On this setup, we can reduce the full filtration using Lemma A.1 reported in Appendix A. For
denoting the spaces of random variables and processes, we use standard notations which are given
in Appendix B.
2.2. A Motivation. Before delving into the details, we will explain a motivation of our risk-
sharing problem with a simple model. Let us consider two agents, A and B with constant funding
rates RA and RB. We moreover, consider a situation that the Agent A buys from the Agent B
an uncollateralized bond of unit notional amount and maturity T . If the two agents were able to
fund by the (so-called) risk-free rate r, the fair value of the two parties would be e−rT . However,
when Ri, i ∈ {A,B}, are not equal to r, the fair values of two parties are different to the parties,
and the two parties would want to recoup their individual adjustments: (e−R
iT − e−rt). Given the
asymmetry by funding difference, we want to model how the price is determined.
To this end, let p be the adjustment price “given to A” on top of the (clean) risk-neutral price
e−rT , e.g., for the bond contract, A pays −e−rT + p to B at initiation of the contract. This money
is invested in their funding accounts up to T , and at the maturity, the Agent A will receive 1 dollar
amount from the Agent B. Therefore, the respective profit and loss of the two parties at T will be
V A,pT = (−e−rT + p)eR
AT + 1, V B,pT = (e
−rT − p)eRBT − 1.
For the time being, we assume that the two parties both have the same preference of exponential
utility as U(x) = −e−x. Then, we find an optimal adjustment price p∗ to maximize the two parties’
aggregated utility of discounted P/L by their own funding rates, namely,
p∗ = argmax
p∈R
[
U
(− e−rT + p+ e−RAT )+ λU(e−rT − p− e−RBT )],(2.2)
for some λ > 0. The parameter λ can be interpreted as a relative bargaining power of B. By
straightforward calculation, (2.2) becomes
p∗ = −e
−RAT + e−R
BT
2
+ e−rT − ln (λ)
2
.(2.3)
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From (2.3), if the two agents have the same negotiation power, i.e., λ = 1, the optimal adjustment
price p∗ is determined as the middle of the individual adjustments, i.e.,
p∗ = −1
2
[
(e−R
AT − e−rT ) + (e−RBT − e−rT )
]
.(2.4)
In addition, as λ increases, the contract becomes more advantageous to the Agent B. In the case
that the Agent B is a government, λ can be large possibly due to tax benefits in buying treasury
securities. However, it should be mentioned that λ is generally not observable in markets, so the
importance of our model mainly remains in theoretical analysis. In the following sections, we
describe the agents’ P/L with more details in terms of hedging portfolios for entering a derivative
contract.
Remark 2.3. A condition of funding transfer policy (FTP) that is beneficial to both parties was
also discussed by [4]. It was shown that (2.4) is one of the choices satisfying their condition; see
[4, Proposition 5.1]. However, there may be many choices of the FTP satisfying the condition, so
instead, we investigate the prices which are the best to the parties.
2.3. Hedging Portfolio under Bilateral Contracts. In this section, under CVA, DVA,
funding spread, and collateral, we define the two parties’ hedging portfolios for entering a contract.
We mostly depict the hedging portfolio in view of A. Then the portfolio of B can be derived by a
similar way.
2.3.1. Dividend, Close-out Amount, and Collateral. We begin this section by explaining
the cash-flow in bilateral contracts. Consider two agents who want to enter a bilateral contract which
exchanges promised dividends. We denote the cumulative dividend process by D. We assume that
D is an F-adapted càdlàg process and is independent of defaults. The value of D is determined by
an n-dimensional F-adapted (i.e., non-defaultable) underlying asset S = (S1, . . . , Sn) that satisfies
the following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dSit = µ
i
tS
i
t dt+ (σ
i
t)
⊤Sit dWt, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,(2.5)
where σi ∈ Rd and µi ∈ R are F-predictable. Moreover, we denote µ ∈ Rn and σ ∈ Rn×d such that
(µ)i = µ
i and row(σ)i = σ
i.
It is not assumed that n = d. In other words, the considered market may or may not be
complete regardless of whether assets to hedge default risk, such as CDSs and bonds, are traded.
In this paper, we consider markets with the absence of assets to hedge the default risk. We only
assume that for all t, σt is of full rank so that we can define the risk premium Λ as a solution of
σΛ = (µ− r1),(2.6)
where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rd and r is an F-adapted process which represents overnight indexed swap
(OIS) rate. We will later use Λ for a pricing measure to define close-out amount. Recall that the
existence of Λ guarantees arbitrage-free condition in classical context. However, since the classical
definition of arbitrage opportunity does not reflect adequately the hedger-specific nature of bilateral
contracts, there have been many studies to redefine arbitrage opportunity properly in the context
of bilateral contracts. The condition being developed is slightly different from paper to paper, but
often absence of arbitrage opportunity is obtained with similar conditions to (2.6). See, for example,
[12, Proposition 3.3]. For definitions of hedger-specific arbitrage opportunities, readers can refer to
[12, 10, 6, 7, 8, 41, 40].
We set, as a convention, a positive value (resp. negative) of dividend process at a certain
moment to mean that the Agent A pays to (resp. is paid by) the Agent B. For example, if A sells a
put option on S with the exercise price κ and maturity T , then for any t ≥ 0, Dt = 1t≥T (κ−ST )+.
Note that the initial price exchanged at initiation of the contract is not a part of D. We will include
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the initial price in the hedging portfolios as their initial value. Because jumps of an F-adapted càdlàg
process are exhausted by F-stopping times by [35, Theorem 4.21], and τ avoids any F-stopping time
(recall (2.1)), D does not jump at default, i.e.,
∆Dτ = 0, almost surely.(2.7)
Let us turn to explain close-out amount and margin process. The obligation on dividend D may
not be fully honored at one party’s default. For the default risk, covenants of the close-out amount
and collateral are documented in a Credit Support Annex1 before initiation of the contract. At the
event of default, the dividend stream stops and CSA close-out amount should be settled. However,
because of the default, the defaulting party would not be able to pay the full close-out amount. To
mitigate the risk of losses at default, collateral is exchanged between the two parties. In bilateral
contracts, variation margin and initial margin are posted in general, and the close-out amount is
often determined as mark-to-market exposure.
In our model, only variation margin is a part of the control variables of our stochastic control
problem that will be introduced later. We exclude initial margin for simplicity. As stated in
[13, p.12], “the amount of variation margin reflects the size of this current exposure,” and it is
recommended that “the full amount necessary to fully collateralise the mark-to-market exposure
of the non-centrally cleared derivatives must be exchanged” [13, p.15]. The meaning behind this
regulation will be discussed later based on our model.
Remark 2.4. For general practices of initial margin, readers can refer to [45, 22]. In addition,
initial margin causes associated BSDEs anticipated. For the numerical simulation of anticipated
BSDEs, readers can refer to [1].
Now, we depict the close-out amount and variation margin mathematically. One of the popular
choices to calculate the market exposure is clean price which is basically the classical risk-neutral
price. As used in the classical pricing, we use the “so-called” risk-free rate. Note that it is a little
out of context to call it the risk-free rate since arguments under bilateral contracts are from the
reality that dealers cannot access to the risk-free rate, yet it is acknowledged that OIS rate is the
best proxy for the so-called risk-free rate. Thus, in what follows, we use OIS rate for evaluating the
clean price, and denote it by (rt)t≥0. We assume (rt)t≥0 is F-adapted and denote by B the money
market account on (rt)t≥0, namely
Bt := exp
(∫ t
0
rs ds
)
for any t ≥ 0.
We can find the pricing measure Q such that B−1Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are (Q,F)-local martingales because
σ is of full rank as in (2.6). Let et denote the new mark-to-market exposure at t ≤ T . We assume
that the market exposure is calculated as clean price:
Assumption 2.5. For any t ∈ [0, T ], et = BtEQ
( ∫ T
t
B−1s dDs
∣∣∣Ft).
By Assumption 2.5, we can derive some properties of (et)t≥0. We report the proof in Appen-
dix D.
Lemma 2.6. (i) eT = 0.
(ii) eτ¯ = 1τ≤T eτ .
(iii) det =
(
rtet +BtZtΛt
)
dt+BtZt dWt − dDt, for t ∈ [0, T ], for some Z ∈ H2,dT,loc.
(iv) eτ− = eτ almost surely.
Remark 2.7. Notice that Z is closely related with the delta risk of e˜t = B
−1
t et. Indeed, if e
is Malliavin differentiable and is a smooth function of St, i.e., e˜t = e˜(t, St), then by Clark-Ocone
1A part of ISDA Master Agreement.
A RISK-SHARING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL CONTRACTS 7
formula, Zt = Dte˜t = [diag(St)σt]
⊤∇S e˜(t, St), where Dt is the Malliavin derivative operator at
t and ∇S is the classical gradient. We shall see later that Z has a special role to interpret the
meaning behind full collateralization. In addition, if D ∈ S2T , we can choose Z in H2,dT .
Letmt denote the amount of variation margin posted at t ≤ T . Similarly,mt ≥ 0 (resp. mt < 0)
means that A posts (resp. receives) the margin to B at time t ≤ T . We assume (mt)t≥0 is an F-
adapted càdlàg process. Note thatm is chosen to be F-adapted for consistency in financial modeling.
The collateral is required because we do not know the full information of default. Therefore, the
amount of collateral is calculated only by available information F. The admissible set will be defined
more precisely when the risk-sharing problem is introduced.
Once one party announces bankruptcy, the margin process stops. Therefore, at the default
τ ≤ T , the amount of collateral is mτ−, but wealth which amounts to eτ +∆Dτ (= eτ a.s) should
be transferred from A to B. In addition, the loss by breach of the contract will be inflicted to the
Agent B (resp. A) only when τ = τA and eτ ≥ mτ− (resp. τ = τB and eτ < mτ−). Denoting the
loss rate of the Agent A (resp. B) by LA (resp. LB), the amount by breach is
1τ=τAL
A(eτ −mτ−)+ − 1τ=τBLB(eτ −mτ−)−.
We assume that Li, i ∈ {A,B}, are positive constant. Finally, we can define the full cash-flow C as
Ct :=1τ>tDt + 1τ≤t
(
Dτ + eτ
)
− 1τ=τA≤tLA(eτ +∆Dτ −mτ−)+ + 1τ=τB≤tLB(eτ +∆Dτ −mτ−)−.
By (2.7) and the last item in Lemma 2.6, for any t ≤ T , almost surely
Ct =1τ>tDt + 1τ≤t
(
Dτ + eτ
)
− 1τ=τA≤tLA(eτ −mτ−)+ + 1τ=τB≤tLB(eτ −mτ−)−.(2.8)
In the next section, we define a self-financing portfolios to hedge against C with more details.
We construct the portfolio in view of the Agent A since the portfolio of the Agent B is in most ways
similar. Before proceeding, we provide some remarks related to possible extensions of our model.
Remark 2.8. (i) One may argue that clean price is not an appropriate close-out amount
since the Agent B’s default is not considered. However, taking default risk of the Agent
B into the exposure may heavily penalize the surviving party, because the default event of
one party can negatively affect the creditworthiness of the surviving party, especially when
the defaulting member has an impact on systemic risk. For such discussion, readers can
refer to [21].
(ii) In practice, variation margin is called on intra-day basis (say, two or three times per day).
In this paper, we assume a continuous margin process for simplicity. One may want to
model variation margin as a càdlàg step process to describe reality more precisely, cf. [20].
(iii) Underlying assets subject to defaults are beyond the scope of this paper. For modeling
with emphasis on contagion risk, readers may want to refer to [38, 17, 18, 16].
(iv) In reality, it is hard to estimate exact default intensities. For example, dependence be-
tween the Agent B’s exposure and default probability is not negligible, which is sometimes
called right/wrong way risk, but it is challenging to estimate the dependence from market
quotation. Thus, such issues lead to robust pricing arguments. See [34, 9].
2.3.2. Self-Financing Hedging Portfolio. The funding sources of an agent can be an ex-
ternal funding provider, treasury department, repo markets, etc. After the financial crisis, such
funding rates do not represent the risk-free rate (approximately OIS rate in recent times). We
consider F-adapted processes (Ri,mt )t≥0, i ∈ {A,B}, to represent the margin funding rates offered
from margin lenders, and denote that for t ≥ 0,
Bi,mt := exp
(∫ t
0
Ri,ms ds
)
.(2.9)
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A B
rm
RA,m RB,m
Margin provider
Funding desk
Margin provider
Funding desk
RA RB
Fig. 1: Interest rates among parties. When a party is funded from its internal funding provider for
delivering collateral, Ri,m = Ri. In practice, rm is often chosen as federal funds rate or EONIA
rate, i.e., rm = r.
Another cash-flow stream associated with margin process is remuneration from margin receivers.
When variation margin is pledged by (resp. received by) the Agent A, the Agent B should remu-
nerate (resp. should be remunerated by) the Agent A with respect to an interest rate. We let rm
and Bm denote the remuneration rate and account of the Agent A. Therefore, for each party, the
net cost/benefit involved in posting the margin is determined by Ri,m − rm, i ∈ {A,B}, and we
denote this spread by si,m, i.e.,
si,m := Ri,m − rm, i ∈ {A,B}.(2.10)
In general, rehypothecation is allowed for variation margin, in other words, the margin account can
be used to maintain the hedging portfolio. We moreover, assume that the two parties should finance
their operations by interest rates Ri, i ∈ {A,B}, for constructing the rest of the portfolios. We
denote the associated funding account and spread by Bi and si, i ∈ {A,C}, respectively, i.e.,
Bit := exp
( ∫ t
0
Ris ds
)
,(2.11)
sit :=R
i
t − rt.(2.12)
Then, each party constructs their hedging portfolio using the above accounts and risky as-
sets (Bi, Bi,m, Bm, S), i ∈ {A,B}. Let ϕi := (ηi, ηi,m, ηm, ηi,S) denote the respective units of
(Bi, Bi,m, Bm, S), i ∈ {A,B}, in the hedging portfolios and we call ϕi the trading strategy of the
Agent i. We assume that ϕi, i ∈ {A,B}, are G-predictable and use the convention that a positive
unit of trading strategy means long position.
If the Agent A posts collateral which amounts to mt at t, she needs to deliver η
A,m
t shares of
the account BA,mt from the margin lender. Then, the Agent A will have η
m
t shares of the margin
account Bmt to which the remuneration from the Agent B is accrued. Thus,
ηmBm = m,(2.13)
ηA,mBA,m + ηmBm = 0,(2.14)
ηB,mBB,m − ηmBm = 0.(2.15)
Remark 2.9. As in practice, we consider cash collateral which is rehypothecated. Sometimes it
is possible that risky assets can be posted as collateral and the margin account is segregated, which
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means that the account is not included in the hedging portfolio. When we consider a different
convention, the mathematical structure of wealth process also become different. For the various
conventions, readers may want to refer to [12, 28]. In addition, the amount of collateral may depend
on the value of the hedging portfolio, which is sometimes called endogenous collateralization. [23]
and [46] discussed endogenous collateralization by PDEs and BSDEs, respectively.
Now, we are in a position to define a self-financing portfolio.
Definition 2.10. If V At = V
A
t (ϕ
A,C), t ∈ [0, T ], defined as
V At = η
A
t B
A
t + η
A,m
t B
A,m
t + η
m
t B
m
t + η
A,S
t St,(2.16)
satisfies
V At =V
A
0 +
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηAs dB
A
s +
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηA,ms dB
A,m
s +
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηms dB
m
s
+
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηA,Ss dSs − Ct∧τ¯ ,(2.17)
for any t ∈ [0, T ], then V A is called the self-financing portfolio of the Agent A.
Remark 2.11. Note that for t > τ¯ , V At = V
A
τ¯ . In (2.17), Ct∧τ¯ = Ct, for any t ≥ 0, by the
definition (2.8).
The self-financing portfolio of the Agent B is defined similarly. The difference is the direction of
variation margin and C. Then, by (2.10), (2.13)-(2.17), we can see that self-financing portfolio
processes of the Agent A and, similarly, the Agent B follow
dV At =
(
RAt V
A
t − sA,mt mt + ηA,St ⊙ St[µt − 1RAt ]
)
dt+ ηA,St ⊙ Stσt dWt − dCt,(2.18)
dV Bt =
(
RBt V
B
t + s
B,mmt + η
B,S
t ⊙ St[µt − 1RBt ]
)
dt + ηB,St ⊙ Stσt dWt + dCt,(2.19)
where ⊙ is component-wise product. If we consider an agent who has a naked position against
market risk, we set ηi,S = 0. Before examining whether (2.18) and (2.19) are well defined, we first
want to introduce our target problem.
We find the best initial price and amount of variation margin to optimize the aggregated
utilities of both parties. If there were no adjustment in pricing, the classical risk-neutral price e0
should be exchanged at initiation of the contract. Let p denote the amount paid to the Agent A on
top of e0. Therefore, initial price paid to the Agent A is e0+ p. More precisely, denoting the initial
endowment of each party by νA and νB ,
V A0 = ν
A + e0 + p, and V
B
0 =ν
B − e0 − p.
Thus, V i depends on the choice of (p,m). For simplicity of notations, we often suppress (p,m),
e.g., V i = V i,p,m, i ∈ {A,B}. Then, with an admissible set A, utilities Ui : R→ R, and λ > 0, we
define the risk-sharing problem as follows:
(p∗,m∗) = argmax
(p,m)∈A
E
[
UA
(
(BAτ¯ )
−1V A,p,mτ¯
)
+ λUB
(
(BBτ¯ )
−1V B,p,mτ¯
)]
.(2.20)
We will define A more precisely in the following section. Note that hedging strategies are not
control variables. In other words, we assume that two parties choose their strategies by their own
methodologies not by the risk-sharing framework. It can be said that λ is the relative bargaining
power of the Agent B, or how much the Agent A wants to enter the contract. One can also think
of λ as the belief of how much funding spread should be acknowledged in derivative transactions.
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As we set the conventions in subsection 2.3.2, p∗ is the amount paid to the Agent A on top of
e0. This additional payment is necessary because of default risk and funding spread. If two parties
price the contracts individually, the calculated prices may be different to each party because of
different funding spread on this model. Therefore, when the contract is made with the initial price
e0 + p
∗, some parties should accept a cost. Thus, p∗ can be seen as the cost that is agreed by the
two parties to enter the contract, so we call p∗ agreement-cost . We also call m∗ optimal collateral
(or margin), and (p∗,m∗) risk-sharing contract.
Before giving the detail, we first provide motivation about the discounting factors behind the
choice of our model (2.20). In (2.20), the values of the portfolios were adjusted by discounting
factors. The discounting factors are necessary for a fairness since the two agents have different
funding rates. In general, the higher default risk is, the higher funding rate is. However, a hedging
portfolio grows with respect to its funding rate (recall (2.18) and (2.19)). Therefore, without the
discounting factors, we penalize a party under a healthier credit condition.
One may want to put the discounting factors outside of utilities as it is a typical choice in
portfolio optimization literature. In this case, when the portfolio processes evolve forwardly, the
effect of funding rates is mixed with risk aversion parameters in the utilities. However, the future
value is purely discounted without consideration of risk aversions, so we would again end up with
punishing or rewarding a certain party depending on risk aversions. An argument in the same
context was discussed in [48].
For the utilities, we will investigate two cases:
UA(x) = x, UB(x) = −e−γ
Bx,(2.21)
UA(x) = −e−γ
Ax, UB(x) = −e−γ
Bx,(2.22)
for some γi > 0. We choose the exponential utilities mainly for simplicity. To use a power utility,
we need for V i, i ∈ {A,B}, to be lower bounded. To this end, boundedness condition should be
imposed to (p,m), but this makes the exposition more complicated. Moreover, an explicit form of
optimal collateral is not generally obtained under power utilities.
To solve the risk-sharing problem, we need different restrictions to funding spread depending
on the choice of utilities for characterizing the optimal collateral. The restrictions are required
mainly because the value functions w.r.t variation margin is not concave. More precisely, we will
need that sB,m = 0 in (2.21), and sA,m = sB,m = 0 in (2.22). The conditions on funding spread
can be assumed not only when the capital structure of a party has small leverage but also when
the party achieves secured funding for variation margin. This situation is not common, but some
examples for the secured funding were discussed by [3].
There is another interpretation to keep the funding condition without loss of much generality,
which is partly justified by a complete market argument. It was shown in complete market models
that an agent can guarantee that they do not switch their position of funding state between lending
and borrowing position, depending on the structure of the payoff. This binary nature of funding
state is related to whether payoff functions are non-increasing or non-decreasing with respect to
underlying assets. For the details, see Proposition 5.8 in [32] and refer to [42]. To streamline
this paper, we deal with cases of (2.22), in the main sections. For the cases of risk-neutral agent,
we report the analysis in Appendix C. Therefore, the following assumption stands throughout the
following sections except Appendix C.
Assumption 2.12. (i) sA,m = sB,m = 0,
(ii) UA(x) = −e−γAx and UB(x) = −e−γBx.
In the next section, we represent (2.20) in a reduced form with a more precise definition of the
admissible set. (2.20) is one type of principal-agent problems. This problem is often called the first
best case in typical principal-agent context. In general, it is challenging to solve principal-agent
problems because the solvability of involved equations, e.g., coupled FBSDEs, is not easy to obtain.
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Since we also encounter a similar difficulty as well as non-concavity, we need to modify the dynamic
version of our problem and impose some restrictions depending on the utilities. We will explain
this point with more detail in section 3.
2.4. Reduction of Filtration. We start this section with introducing a long list of notations.
The following notations are often used in this paper. For i ∈ {A,B}, t ∈ [0, T ],
V¯ At := (B
A
t )
−1(V At − et∧τ¯ ), V¯ Bt := (BBt )−1(V Bt + et∧τ¯),(2.23)
vt := (B
A
t )
−1et, ct := (B
A
t )
−1mt,(2.24)
δt := vt − ct, Kt := BAt (BBt )−1,(2.25)
πit := (B
i
t)
−1ηi,St ⊙ Stσt, ∆it := Bt(Bit)−1Zt,(2.26)
φ¯At := π
A
t −∆At , φ¯Bt := πBt +∆Bt ,(2.27)
σtΛ
i
t := (µt −Rit1), bit := Λit − Λt,(2.28)
Θt(δ) := 1τA=tL
Aδ+ − 1τB=tLBδ−.(2.29)
We give some remarks on the above notations.
Remark 2.13. By (2.23), V¯ i, i ∈ {A,B} are (discounted) adjustment processes. By (2.24), v is
the discounted market exposure, and c is the discounted collateral, and by (2.25), δ is the difference
between the two processes. Note that δ = v − c = 0 means full collateralization. By (2.26), ∆i,
i ∈ {A,B}, are the delta-risk of the market exposure adjusted by the funding rate of each party.
By (2.27), φ¯i, i ∈ {A,B}, are the difference between the amount invested in the risky assets and
delta risk of the clean price,i.e., φ¯i can be seen as the hedging error. If the Agent B does not hedge
the market risk, we have φ¯B = ∆B. Notice that if bi = 0, then Ri = r, by (2.28).
We will find the projections of V¯ i onto F, then we will deal with the risk-sharing problem mainly
with the reduced processes. For any i ∈ {A,B}, we let φi denote the F-predictable reduction of φ¯i
until τ¯ . Namely, φi, i ∈ {A,B}, are F-predictable and
1t≤τ¯ φ¯
i
t = 1t≤τ¯φ
i
t.
By Itô’s formula and (2.24), v satisfies, for t ∈ [0, T ],
dvt =
(− sAt vt +∆At Λt) dt+∆At dWt − (BAt )−1 dDt.
Note that v is exogenously given. Thus, if Ri, i ∈ {A,B}, are independent with V i and V¯ i are
well-defined, then V i are also well defined by (2.23).
Theorem 2.14. Assume si, si,m, i ∈ {A,B}, are bounded and∑
i∈{A,B}
∫ T
0
(
|δt|2 + |Λit|2 + |φit|+ |bit|2 + |∆it|2
)
dt <∞, a.s.
Then, the following processes vA and vB, are well-defined:
dvAt =
(
φAt Λ
A
t +∆
A
t b
A
t + s
A
t vt
)
dt+ φAt dWt,(2.30)
dvBt =
(
φBt Λ
B
t −∆Bt bBt − sBt Ktvt
)
dt+ φBt dWt.(2.31)
Moreover, assume that Ri, i ∈ {A,B}, are independent with V i, and
vA0 =ν
A + p,
vB0 =ν
B − p.
Then vi, i ∈ {A,B}, are F-optional reductions of V¯ i until τ¯ , i.e., vi, i ∈ {H,C}, are F-optional
and 1t<τ¯ V¯
i
t = 1t<τ¯v
i
t, for any t ≥ 0.
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Proof. It is easy to check the first assertion. To check the second part, we apply Itô’s formula
to (BAt )
−1V At and this yields
d
(
(BAt )
−1V At
)
=−RAt (BAt )−1V At dt+ (BAt )−1 dV At
=1t≤τ¯π
A
t Λ
A
t dt+ 1t≤τ¯π
A
t dWt − (BAt )−1 dCt.
In addition, by (2.8) together with vτ = vτ−, a.s,
(BAt )
−1 dCt = 1t≤τ (B
A
t )
−1 dDt + d(1τ≤t)vτ− − d(1τ≤t)Θτ (δτ−).(2.32)
Then, by combining (2.32) and (2.33), we have
dV¯ At =d
(
(BAt )
−1(V At )− vt∧τ¯
)
=1t≤τ¯
(
sAt vt + φ¯
A
t Λ
A
t +∆
A
t b
A
t
)
dt
+ 1t≤τ¯ φ¯
A
t dWt − 1t>τ (BAt )−1 dDt − d(1τ≤t)
(
vτ− −Θτ (δτ−)
)
.(2.33)
It follows that
d
(
1t<τ¯ V¯
A
t
)
=V¯ At− d(1t<τ¯ ) + 1t≤τ¯ dV¯
A
t − δτ¯ (dt)∆V¯ Aτ¯
=V¯ Aτ¯− d(1t<τ¯ ) + 1t≤τ¯
(
sAt vt + φ¯
A
t Λ
A
t +∆
A
t b
A
t
)
dt+ 1t≤τ¯ φ¯
A
t dWt
− d(1t≥τ¯ )
(
vτ− −Θτ (δτ−)
)− δτ¯ (dt)∆V¯ Aτ¯
=1t≤τ¯ dv
A
t − d(1t≥τ¯ )V¯ Aτ¯ − d(1t≥τ¯ )
(
vτ− −Θτ (δτ−)
)
.
Let Yt := 1t<τ¯vAt + 1t≥τ¯ (vAτ− − vτ− + Θτ (δτ−)). Again, by Itô’s formula together with vτ = vτ−,
a.s,
dYt =1t≤τ¯ dvAt − d(1τ¯≤t)vAt− + d(1τ¯≤t)
(
vAτ− − vτ− +Θτ (δτ−
)
=1t≤τ¯ dv
A
t − d(1τ¯≤t)
(
vτ− −Θτ (δτ−)
)
.
Thus, if Y0 = V¯ A0 , we obtain Yt = V¯ At , for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, vA is the F-optional reduction
of V¯ A and more precisely,
V¯ At = 1t<τ¯v
A
t + 1t≥τ¯ (v
A
τ− − vτ− + Θτ (δτ−)).(2.34)
Similarly, we can attain that
V¯ Bt = 1t<τ¯v
B
t + 1t≥τ¯ (v
B
τ− +Kτ−vτ− −Kτ−Θτ (δτ−)).(2.35)
Notice that control of m is equivalent to that of δ since e is given exogenously. Thus, we solve (2.20)
with respect to the two state processes depending on δ:
V i,p,m = V i,p,δ.
Moreover, we denote that c∗ := (BA)−1m∗ and δ∗ := v − c∗.
Now, we are ready reduce the risk-sharing problem. Recall from (2.20) that our goal is to
maximize the sum of utilities of discounted portfolios over all (p, δ) ∈ A:
E
[
UA
(
(BAτ¯ )
−1V A,p,δτ¯
)
+ λUB
(
(BBτ¯ )
−1V B,p,δτ¯
)]
.(2.36)
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To this end, we will represent the two terms in (2.36) as reduced forms. Indeed, by Lemma A.1,
where the integrability conditions hold
E
[
UA
(
(BAτ¯ )
−1V A,p,δτ¯
)]
=E
[
UA
(
1T<τv
A,p
T + 1τ≤T (v
A,p
τ− +Θ
δ
τ )
)]
=E
[
GTUA(v
A,p
T ) +
∫ T
0
Gt
[
hAt UA
(
vA,pt + L
Aδ+t
)
+ hBt UA
(
vA,pt − LBδ−t
)]
dt
]
,
and
E
[
UB
(
(BBτ¯ )
−1V B,p,δτ¯
)]
=E
[
UB
(
1T<τv
B,p
T + 1τ≤T (v
B,p
τ− −KτΘδτ )
)]
=E
[
GTUB(v
B,p
T ) +
∫ T
0
Gt
[
hAt UB
(
vB,pt − LAKtδ+
)
+ hBt UB
(
vB,pt + L
BKtδ
−
t
)]
dt
]
.
We define gt := 1δ≥0g
+
t + 1δ<0g
−
t , where
g+t (v
A, vB, δ) :=Gt
[
hAt
(
UA(v
A + LAδ) + λUB(v
B − LAKtδ)
)
+ hBt
(
UA(v
A) + λUB(v
B)
)]
g−t (v
A, vB, δ) :=Gt
[
hBt
(
UA(v
A + LBδ) + λUB(v
B − LBKtδ)
)
+ hAt
(
UA(v
A) + λUB(v
B)
)]
.
For the above reduction to be valid, we assume the following integrbility condition:
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
|Ui(viT )|+
∫ T
0
|Ui(vit)| dt
]
<∞,(2.37)
and we define the admissible set of collateral D for a given Borel set A ⊆ R as follows:
Definition 2.15. δ ∈ D, if δ ∈ H2T and
(i) δ ∈ A, dP⊗ dt− a.s,
(ii) E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣gt(vA,pt , vB,pt , δt)∣∣dt] <∞.
Then, the risk-sharing problem can be rewritten as
max
(p,δ)∈A
E
[
GTUA(v
A,p
T ) + λGTUB(v
B,p
T ) +
∫ T
0
gt(v
A,p
t , v
B,p
t , δt) dt
]
,(2.38)
where A = R×D and vi, i ∈ {A,B}, are defined in (2.23)-(2.28), (2.30), and (2.31). Note that vi
does not depend on δ since we assume sA,m = sB,m = 0. When the Agent A is risk-neutral, we
only need that sB,m = 0, and in this case D should be defined in a slightly different way. We will
discuss this with more details in Appendix C.
Remark 2.16. (i) The risk-sharing framework can be thought of as a two-agent problem.
Since there is no party who can solely decide the contract, the mathematical structure of
our risk-sharing problem is different from that of typical principal-agent problems. For
example, for the Agent A, in both perspectives of funding impacts and loss given defaults,
posting collateral to the Agent B is not beneficial. Say, we consider A as an agent, subject
to B as a principal. Then, if we solve the agent problem first, e.g., as in [30], it always
gives the trivial solution δ∗ = v − c∗ =∞.
14 J. LEE, S. STURM, C. ZHOU
(ii) One may want to take stochastic calculus of variation as in [31]. However, note that g is
piece-wise concave in δ. Even when g is concave, it may not be differentiable. Therefore,
if we take stochastic calculus of variation, we will face a very challenging FBSDE with
a discontinuous coefficient in the drift of (forward) SDE. A similar case was dealt with
by [26]. However, in our case, we encounter multi-dimensional FBSDE with a degenerate
volatility and unbounded coefficients. The solvability of such FBSDE is beyond the scope
of this paper and we leave it as future research. Instead, in this paper, we impose some
conditions on funding cost/benefit in delivering the collateral, si,m, i ∈ {A,B}, depending
on the utilities, and use verification argument.
3. Optimal Collateral. In this section, we characterize the optimal collateral in the risk-
sharing problem by using martingale optimality principle. Then we argue by verification that the
characterized collateral is indeed an optimal solution. First, we solve the problem with respect to
only variation margin δ, with a fixed initial price p ∈ R:
max
δ∈D
E
[
GTUA(v
A,p,δ
T ) + λGTUB(v
B,p,δ
T ) +
∫ T
0
gt(v
A,p,δ
t , v
B,p,δ
t , δt) dt
]
.(3.1)
Then, the agreement-cost p∗ will be found with the given optimal variation margin δ∗. However,
mainly because of the non-concave property of our problem addressed in Remark 2.16, we need
to impose some restrictions to the funding spread in delivering collateral for the characterization.
Recall that we consider two cases: a risk-neutral Agent A and risk-averse the Agent B investing
their capital with a small leverage so that sB,m = 0, and two risk averse parties with sB,m =
sA,m = 0. As we mentioned, the mathematical analysis for a risk-neutral agent is deferred to
Appendix C. In what follows, we first derive an optimal collateral for both cases, then we give
financial interpretations later. The two most notable features are the weak dependence with default
intensities and relationship with the full margin requirement. The discussion about the relationship
between the optimal collateral and margin requirement is an important part of this paper.This
funding condition is not necessary for finding p∗ if δ is not a control variable, e.g. A = {δ0} for
some δ0 ∈ R.
We define a dynamic version of (2.38) and use martingale optimality principle (MOP) as in
[39]. To this end, we define a set of controls which coincide with a given ε ∈ D up to a certain time
t ≤ T . We denote the set by D(t, ε), i.e., for ε ∈ D, D(t, ε) := {δ ∈ D∣∣δ.∧t = ε·∧t}. Now, define the
dynamic version of (3.1) as
Jεt (p) := ess sup
δ∈D(t,ε)
E
[
GTUA(v
A,p
T ) + λGTUB(v
B,p
T ) +
∫ T
t
gs(v
A,p
s , v
B,p
s , εs) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft].(3.2)
Then we characterize the optimal collateral by using martingale optimality principle. By MOP,
(Jεt )0≤t≤T is chosen as a càdlàg version such that for any ε ∈ D,{
Jεt +
∫ t
0
gs(v
A
s , v
B
s , εs) ds
}
0≤t≤T
is a (P,F)-supermartingale. Moreover, for the optimal collateral δ∗ for J0,{
Jδ
∗
t +
∫ t
0
gs(v
A
s , v
B
s , δ
∗
s ) ds ds
}
0≤t≤T
is a (P,F)-martingale. When the admissibility is guaranteed, a solution to (3.1) can be found by
verification.
Before moving on, to represent the optimal collateral by one stochastic process, we define a
process (Xt)t≥0 such that
UA(Xt) :=
UA(v
A
t )
−UB
(
vBt − vB0
) = − exp[− γA(vAt − γBγA (vBt − vB0 ))
]
.(3.3)
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Namely, Xt = v
A
t − (γB/γA)(vBt − vB0 ). More precisely, X is given by
Xt =v
A
0 +
∫ t
0
[
stvt + φ
A
t Λ
A
t −
γB
γA
φBt Λ
B
t +∆
A
t b
A
t +
γB
γA
∆Bt b
B
t
]
ds+
∫ t
0
φs dWs,(3.4)
Then, (3.1) will be represented w.r.t X , and where φt := φ
A
t − (γB/γA)φBt and st := sAt +
(γB/γA)sBt Kt.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that the integrability condition (2.37) hold. Define
δ∗t (p, x) := argmax
δ∈A
{
UA(x)ψ
A
t (δ) + λUB(v
B,p
0 )ψ
B
t (δ)
}
,(3.5)
ψAt (δ) :=− hAt UA(LAδ+)− hBt UA(−LBδ−),(3.6)
ψBt (δ) :=− hAt UB(−LAKtδ+)− hBt UB(LBKtδ−).(3.7)
If δ∗(p,X) ∈ D, then δ∗(p,X) is a solution of (3.1). Moreover,
J0 = E
[
βT
[
UA(XT ) + λUB(ν
B − p)]+ ∫ T
0
fˆt(p,Xt) dt
]
,(3.8)
where βt := −GtUB
(
vBt − vB0
)
and
fˆt(p, x) := βt
[
UA(x)ψ
A
t (δ
∗
t (p, x)) + λUB(ν
B − p)ψBt (δ∗t (p, x))
]
.(3.9)
Proof. For ε ∈ D, define ξεt := Jt +
∫ t
0 gs(v
A
s , v
B
s , εs) ds. Notice that Jt is independent of ε ∈ D
and by (3.6) and (3.7),
−[GtUB(vBt − vB0 )]−1gt(vAt , vBt , εt) =UA(Xt)ψAt (εt) + λUB(vB0 )ψBt (εt).
Therefore, for any ε ∈ D, ξε − ξδ∗(p,X) is a (P,F)-supermartingale. Moreover, for any ǫ ∈ D
E
[
ξǫT − ξδ
∗(p,X)
T
] ≤ E[ξǫ0 − ξδ∗(p,X)0 ] = 0.(3.10)
Thus, (3.8) is obtained where the admissibility of δ∗(p,X) is guaranteed.
To find the explicit form of δ∗(p,X), we consider A = R and represent (3.5) as
δ∗t (p, x) := argmax
δ∈A
(
1δ<0f
−(t, p, x, δ) + 1δ≥0f
+(t, p, x, δ)
)
,
for some functions f−, f+. Then, f i, i ∈ {−,+} are continuously differentiable in δ and for any
(t, p, x), there exist Iit (p, x) such that
∂δf
i(t, p, x, Iit (p, x)) = 0.(3.11)
Then, δ∗(p,X) can be attained at I−, I+, and zero. We can easily see that
f−(t, p, x, δ) :=hBt
[
UA(x+ L
Bδ) + λUB(ν
B − p− LBKtδ)
]
+ hAt
[
UA(x) + λUB(ν
B − p)],(3.12)
f+(t, p, x, δ) :=hAt
[
UA(x+ L
Aδ) + λUB(ν
B − p− LAKtδ)
]
+ hBt
[
UA(x) + λUB(ν
B − p− LBKt)
]
.(3.13)
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Therefore, we obtain that
I−t (p, x) :=
γBνB − γBp− γAx− ln (λKt γBγA )
LB(γBKt + γA)
,(3.14)
I+t (p, x) :=
γBνB − γBp− γAx− ln (λKt γBγA )
LA(γBKt + γA)
.(3.15)
The exact form of δ∗ can be obtained by characterizing the region{
max
R
f− > max
R
f+
}
.
The calculation of the region is a straightforward but tedious; see, e.g., [24]. We only obtain the
exact form for a simple case which will be seen later. We complete Theorem 3.1 by the next lemma.
The proof is reported in Appendix D.
Lemma 3.2. Let A = R, and assume (et)t≥0, (Zt)t≥0, (π
i
t)t≥0, i ∈ {A,B}, are bounded. Then
δ∗(p,X) ∈ D and (2.37) hold.
Example 3.3. Consider an Agent A who hedges delta-risk and an Agent B who does not hedge,
i.e., πA = ∆A, πB = 0. They enter a bond contract that is paid by the Agent A, namely, D = 1JT,∞K.
We assume that OIS rate (rt)t≥0 follows the next SDE:
drt = k(θ − rt) dt+ ρ√rt dWQt ,
for some k, θ, ρ ∈ R and a risk-neutral measure Q. Moreover, we assume that hi, i ∈ {A,B}, are
bounded and sB = sB,m = 0. Then, by Clark-Ocone formula, for t ≥ 0,
Zt =− ρ√rtA2(t, T )B−1t et,
where
et =A
1(t, T )e−rtA
2(t,T ),
A1(t, T ) :=
( 2ae(a+k)(T−t)/2
2a+ (a+ k)(ea(T−t) − 1)
)2kθ/ρ2
,
A2(t, T ) :=
2(ea(T−t) − 1)
2a+ (a+ k)(ea(T−t) − 1) ,
a :=
√
k2 + 2ρ2.
Since r > 0, Z is bounded. Hence, all conditions in Lemma 3.2 are satisfied.
Now, we are ready to discuss the financial interpretation of the optimal collateral. In the next
section, the financial meanings of (3.14)-(3.15) and the relationship with the margin requirement
will be discussed.
3.1. Analysis of Collateral. In this section, we provide financial interpretations of the opti-
mal collateral derived in the previous sections. Collateral is posted for default risk. In our model,
there are two main components in default risk: intensities and loss rates. We first discuss a weak
dependence between the optimal collateral and default intensities. We begin with giving the explicit
form of δ∗ in the following lemma. We report the proof in Appendix D.
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Lemma 3.4. Assume A = R. Then, δ∗t (p, x) is given by
δ∗t (p, x) =(0 ∨ I+t (p, x)) + (0 ∧ I−t (p, x)), where(3.16)
I−t (p, x) :=
−γAx− γBp
LB(γBKt + γA)
+
γBνB − ln (λKt γBγA )
LB(γBKt + γA)
,(3.17)
I+t (p, x) :=
−γAx− γBp
LA(γBKt + γA)
+
γBνB − ln (λKt γBγA )
LA(γBKt + γA)
.(3.18)
Note from (3.16)-(3.18) that the optimal collateral depends only on the loss rates Li not on default
intensities hi, which is a rather natural consequence. Collateral is required for loss given default
not for the default itself. Put differently, collateral is about how much loss would be inflicted at
default and not about how likely default occurs. Recalling δ∗ = v − c∗ and observing (3.17) and
(3.18), the magnitude of the optimal variation margin c∗ increases as Li, i ∈ {A,B}, increase.
We discuss the effect of loss rates with more details. By (3.16), when δ∗(p,X) ≤ 0, I−(p,X) =
δ∗(p,X). In this case, as LB increases, c∗ = v− δ∗(p,X) decrease sbecause of the increased average
loss of collateral posted to the Agent B. On the other hand, when δ∗(p,X) ≥ 0, the optimal
collateral c∗ = v − δ∗(p,X), is independent of LB and increases w.r.t LA. Again, this is because
the high loss rate makes it risky for the Agent B to post collateral to the Agent A.
The relationships with p and λ are self-explanatory. If the contract starts from giving a high
price p, to the Agent A at initiation of the contract, the Agent A needs to post more collateral in
return. Moreover, the higher λ is, i.e., the strong bargaining power the Agent B has, the more the
Agent A should post more collateral.
In addition, recalling Xt = v
A
t − (γB/γA)(vBt − vB0 ), it seems that (3.16) suggests that optimal
collateral ratio should be decided by the relative performance of each party. It is not obviously
applicable in practice. However, we can use X to derive an interesting interpretation from the full
margin requirement of Basel III, which will be discussed in the next section.
Remark 3.5. From (3.16)-(3.18), the major factor for collateral is the loss rate. In practice, loss
rates are often chosen as 0.6 regardless of entities. Our model together with the practice on loss
rates partly explains the margin requirement applied to all banks.
3.2. Analysis of the Full Margin Requirement. In this section, we interpret the meaning
behind the inter-dealer market convention that is required by Basel III. It can be understood that
the inter-dealer convention is δ∗(p,X) = 0. By (3.14) and (3.15), the full margin convention requires
that
Xt +
1
γA
(sA − sB)t = γ
B
γA
(νB − p)− 1
γA
ln
(
λγB
γA
)
, dP⊗ dt− a.s.(3.19)
Therefore, since {Xt+ (γA)−1
∫ t
0 (s
A
s − sBs ) ds}t≥0 should be constant, it is necessary that φ = 0. If
two parties’ hedging strategies are chosen independently of each other, by (3.4), φ = 0 may mean
φA = φB = 0. It follows that πA = ∆A and πB = −∆B. In other words, the two parties should
hedge the delta-risk of market exposure. In addition, together with (3.4), this constant condition
implies that (
sA +
γB
γA
sBKt
)
v +∆AbA +
γB
γA
∆BbB +
sA − sB
γA
= 0, dP⊗ dt− a.s.(3.20)
For (3.20) to hold with arbitrary ∆A and ∆B, we should have sA = sB = 0. Therefore, for the
market convention to be optimal, the following two conditions are necessary:
• both agents hedge the delta-risk of clean price,
• funding spreads are not transferred to each party.
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The second item seems like an expected result because the condition δ∗ = 0 inherently considers
two parties whose earnings from the margin is symmetric. If one can make a profit or suffer a loss
by margin process, δ∗ = 0 may not be optimal. A debate is still underway whether funding spread
should be recouped from counterparties and how to handle the accounting; see, e.g., [36, 37, 25, 5,
2]. Indeed, in frictionless markets, choices of funding are separated with pricing as MM theorem
properly applies. However, with frictional distress costs, shareholders’ decision can depend on the
choices of funding. In such cases, the margin requirement is not optimal anymore. Therefore, the
second condition on funding transfer can be understood that the margin requirement of Basel III
inherently considers frictionless financial markets.
In the next section, we will derive a maximum principle of p∗ for (2.38). Mainly because of an
issue from non-concavity, for finding the optimal pair (p∗, δ∗), we need either sB,m = sA,m = 0 or
A = {δ0}, for some δ0 ∈ R. The second condition means that the variation margin c is fixed as a
given process.
4. Optimal Initial Prices. Throughout this section, the conditions in Lemma 3.2 are as-
sumed so that the admissibility is obtained. The next maximum principle for p∗ is basically a first
order condition. First, we consider the case that δ is not a control variable, i.e. A = {δ0}, for
some δ0 ∈ R. In previous sections, we have assumed that sA,m = sB,m = 0. However, when A is
singleton, we do not need the condition on margin rate.
Theorem 4.1. Assume A = {δ0}, for some δ0 ∈ R. Therefore, δ∗ = δ0. Let X∗ := Xp∗,δ∗ ,
f∗· := fˆ·(p
∗, X∗· ), and for given t ≤ T , define Qt ∈ R2 as the set that f∗t (·) is not differentiable.
Assume
1(p∗,X∗)∈Q = 0, dP⊗ dt− a.s,(4.1)
i.e., (p∗, X∗) does not fall in the non-differentiable set of fˆ , dP⊗ dt− a.s. Moreover, assume
E
[
βTU
′
A(X
∗
T )−βTλU ′B(νB − p∗)
+
∫ T
0
1(p∗,X∗t )/∈Qt
(
∂pfˆt(p
∗, X∗t ) + ∂xfˆt(p
∗, X∗t )
)
dt
]
= 0.(4.2)
Then p∗ is the optimal initial price.
Proof. Notice that f∗t (·) is concave for any t ∈ [0, T ], so is differentiable a.e. The maximum
principle (4.2), is basically a first order condition. We only need to check whether (p∗, X∗) is not
absorbed in Q. Since we assume A = {δ0}, for some δ0 ∈ R, δ∗ does not depend on (p,X). We let,
for any process ϕ, ϕ∗ := ϕp
∗
and, for arbitrary p ∈ R, ∆ϕ∗ := ϕp − ϕ∗. Then,
E
[
∆Y ∗0
]
=E
[
βT
(
UA(X
p
T )− UA(X∗T )
)
+ βTλ
(
UB(ν
B − p)− UB(νB − p∗)
)
+
∫ T
0
∆f∗t dt
]
≤E[βTU ′A(X∗T )∆X∗T − βTλU ′B(νB − p∗)∆p∗ + ∫ T
0
∆f∗t dt
]
≤E[βTU ′A(X∗T )∆X∗T − βTλU ′B(νB − p∗)∆p∗]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
1(p∗,X∗t )/∈Qt
(
∂xfˆt(p
∗, X∗t )∆X
∗
t + ∂pfˆ(p
∗, X∗t )∆p
∗
)
dt
]
.
The last inequality is obtained by concavity of f∗ and (4.1). Notice that ∆X∗t = ∆p
∗, for any
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t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, by (4.2), we have
E
[
Y p0 − Y ∗0
] ≤∆p∗E[βTU ′A(X∗T )− βTλU ′B(νB − p∗)]
+∆p∗E
[ ∫ T
0
1(p∗,X∗t )/∈Qt
(
∂pfˆt(p
∗, X∗t ) + ∂xfˆ(p
∗, X∗t )
)
dt
]
=0.
When we control (p, δ) together, two conditions on the funding spread, sA,m = sB,m = 0, are
required. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 4.2. Assume sA,m = sB,m = 0. Let X∗ := Xp
∗
, f∗· := fˆ·(p
∗, X∗· ), and for given
t ≤ T , define Qt ∈ R2 as the set that f∗t (·) is not differentiable. Assume
1(p∗,X∗)∈Q = 0, dP⊗ dt− a.s,
i.e., (p∗, X∗) does not fall in the non-differentiable set of fˆ , dP⊗ dt− a.s. Moreover, assume
E
[
βTU
′
A(X
∗
T )− βTλU ′B(νB − p∗) +
∫ T
0
1(p∗,X∗t )/∈Qt
(
∂pfˆt(p
∗, X∗t ) + ∂xfˆt(p
∗, X∗t )
)
dt
]
= 0.
Then (p∗, δ∗) is the risk-sharing contract.
We deal with examples in the next section.
5. Examples. In subsection 3.2, it was shown that delta-hedge of clean price and the absence
of market frictions are necessary for the full margin requirement to be optimal. We first derive the
risk-sharing contract given the conditions.
Example 5.1. Assume si,m = si = φi = 0, i ∈ {A,B}, A = R. Therefore, Xp = νA + p, and
β = G. We will check that (p∗, δ∗) = (pˆ, 0) where
pˆ :=
γBνB − γAνA
γB + γA
− 1
γB + γA
ln
(
λγB
γA
)
.(5.1)
By (3.17)-(3.18), we have I+t (X
p
t , p) = (L
A)−1(pˆ−p), I−t (Xpt , p) = (LB)−1(pˆ−p), where pˆ is defined
as (5.1). Thus, by taking p = pˆ, we recover the full margin convention: δ∗ = 0. In addition,
X pˆ + LAI+ =νA + pˆ,
νB − p+ LBI− =νB − pˆ.
Therefore, by (3.9), fˆt is differentiable at (pˆ, X
pˆ), i.e., for t ∈ [0, T ], Qt = ∅. Moreover, by straight
forward calculation, ∂pfˆt(p, x) = −∂xf˜t(p, x), and
U ′A(ν
A + pˆ) = λU ′B(ν
B − pˆ).
Therefore, we obtain (p∗, δ∗) = (pˆ, 0). Note that when γB = γA, νA = νB = 0, λ = 1, then pˆ = 0.
Thus, in this case, (p∗, δ∗) = (0, 0).
If we take γB = γA = 1 and νB = νA = 0, (5.1) is reduced to pˆ = − ln (λ)/2. In particular,
when the two parties have the same negotiation power, i.e., λ = 1, we have pˆ = 0. It can be said
that pˆ represents the amount of adjustment by agents’ preference and negotiation power, which
are non-observable information in markets. Since it is hard for both parties to agree on such
parameters. In addition, it is notable that pˆ does not depend on hi, Li, i ∈ {A,B}, because the
price is mathematically derived from fully collateralized contracts. If one party does not hedge the
delta-risk, we cannot have an explicit solution for pˆ, so we discuss only the existence of p∗ satisfying
(4.2).
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Example 5.2. Assume si,m = 0, and πA = ∆A, πB = 0, i.e., φA = 0, φB = ∆B. We consider
constant default intensities and, without loss of generality, assume that γA = γB, LA = LB = 0.5,
λ = 1, and νA = νB = 0. Therefore, for t ∈ [0, T ],
Xpt = p−
∫ t
0
[(
sAs +
γB
γA
sBs
)
vs +∆
B
s (b
B
s − ΛBs ) + ∆As bAs
]
ds−
∫ t
0
∆Bs dWs,
Iit (p,X
p
t ) = −Xpt − p, i ∈ {−,+}.
Since γA = γB, we denote U := UA = UB. By straightforward calculation, we can check that
Qt = ∅, for t ≤ T , and
∂pfˆt(p,X
p
t ) + ∂xfˆt(p,X
p
t ) =
{ −γhBβt(U(Xpt )− U(−p)), −Xpt − p ≥ 0,
−γhAβt
(
U(Xpt )− U(−p)
)
, −Xpt − p < 0.
Recall that XpT increases as p increases. Therefore, both ∂pfˆ +∂xfˆ and [U
′(XT )−U ′(−p)] decrease
w.r.t p. Moreover, both terms tend to ∞ (resp. −∞) as p → −∞ (resp. p → ∞). Thus, there
exists p ∈ R satisfying (4.2). Once p∗ is obtained, δ∗ can be found as well, but in this case, (p∗, δ∗)
may not be (pˆ, 0), i.e., full collateralization may not be optimal.
6. Conclusion. In this paper, we introduced a new risk-sharing framework to understand
how two parties enter bilateral contracts with the presence of entity-specific information such as
default risk and funding spread. Based on our model, we can explain why banks buy Treasury bonds
that return less than their funding rate. The analysis of the optimal collateral in the risk-sharing
framework interprets the meaning behind the margin requirement in Basel III: two parties hedge
delta risk of clean price and funding spread is not considered in derivative prices. Note that the full
collateralization is really optimal in frictionless financial markets, which is an inherent assumption
in Basel III. It is possible that this conclusion can change if we include gap risk, KVA, and hedging
strategies are also control variables. We leave such analysis as a further research topic.
Appendix A. An Auxiliary Lemma. The next lemma is borrowed from [11] and often
used in this paper.
Lemma A.1. Let i ∈ {A,B}.
(i) Let U be an Fs-measurable, integrable random variable for some s ≥ 0. Then, for any
t ≤ s,
E(1s<τU |Gt) =1t<τG−1t E(GsU |Ft).
(ii) Let (Ut)t≥0 be a real-valued, F-predictable process and E|Uτ¯ | <∞. Then,
E(1τ=τ i≤TUτ |Gt) = 1t<τG−1t E
( ∫ T
t
hisGsUs ds
∣∣∣Ft).
Appendix B. Spaces of Random Variables and Stochastic Processes. In this paper,
we denote spaces of random variables and stochastic processes as follows.
Definition B.1. Let m ∈ N and p ≥ 2.
• LpT : the set of all FT -measurable random variables ξ, such that
‖ξ‖p := E[|ξ|p] 1p <∞.
• SpT : the set of all real valued, F-adapted, càdlàg2 processes (Ut)t≥0, such that
‖U‖Sp
T
:= E
(
sup
t≤T
|Ut|p
) 1
p <∞.
2Right continuous and left limit.
A RISK-SHARING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL CONTRACTS 21
• Hp,mT : the set of all Rm-valued, F-predictable processes (Ut)t≥0, such that
‖U‖Hp
T
:= E
( ∫ T
0
∣∣Ut∣∣p dt) 1p <∞.
• Hp,mT,loc : the set of all Rm-valued, F-predictable processes (Ut)t≥0, such that∫ T
0
∣∣Ut∣∣p dt <∞, a.s.
When d = 1, we denote HpT := H
p,1
T and H
p
T,loc := H
p,1
T,loc.
Appendix C. A Risk-Neutral Agent under Incremental Cash-flow. In this section, we
will derive an optimal collateral with a risk-neutral Agent A: UA(x) = x. As in previous sections,
the Agent B is risk-averse as UB(x) = −e−γBx. In this case, we can relax the assumption on
margin funding rate of A. Then, we intend to derive similar arguments as in subsection 3.1 and
subsection 3.2 with assuming
sA,m > 0.(C.1)
. Now, to model the incremental cash-flow, assume that the bank has had contracts given by some
endowed càdlàg F-adapted processes (DE , eE ,mE) before initiation of the new contract. If the two
parties do not enter the new contract, the cash-flow remains as
C
E
t = 1τ>tD
E
t + 1τ≤t
(
D
E
τ + e
E
τ
)− 1τ=τA≤tLA(eEτ −mEτ−)+ + 1τ=τB≤tLB(eEτ −mEτ−)−.
On the other hand, with the new contract, the exposure and margin become (eE+e) and (mE+m),
respectively. Therefore, with the new contract, the summed cash-flows are
C
S
t :=1τ>t(D
E
t + Dt) + 1τ≤t
(
D
E
τ + Dτ + e
E
τ + eτ
)
− 1τ=τA≤tLA(eEτ + eτ −mEτ− −mτ−)+ + 1τ=τB≤tLB(eEτ + eτ −mEτ− −mτ−)−.
Thus, the amount that should be dealt with by the Agent A is the increment from CE to CS , namely
for t ≤ T ,
Ct :=C
S
t − CEt
=Dt∧(τ−) + 1τ≤teτ− − 1τ=τA≤tLA
(
(eτ− −mτ− + eEτ −mEτ−)+ − (eEτ −mEτ−)+
)
+ 1τ=τB≤tL
B
(
(eτ− −mτ− + eEτ −mEτ−)− − (eEτ −mEτ−)−
)
.(C.2)
Thus, we denote the amount of breach of the contract as
Θt(δ) = 1τA=tL
A
(
(δ + δEt )
+ − (δEt )+
)− 1τB=tLB((δ + δEt )− − (δEt )−).(C.3)
Moreover, by (C.1), the F-reduction of V¯ A, which is derived in Theorem 2.14, becomes slightly
different as
dvA,δt =(s
A,m
t δt + α
A
t ) dt+ φ
A
t dWt
αAt :=s
A,∆
t vt + φ
A
t Λ
A
t +∆
A
t b
A
t
sA,∆t :=s
A
t − sA,mt .
Notice that vA depends on δ since we assumed that sA,m > 0, which is the main mathematical
difference from the main sections. We still assume that the Agent B can deliver the collateral
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without any excessive cost/benefit, i.e., sB,m = 0. In this case, vB does not depend on δ. Because
of the dependence between vA and δ, we impose a slightly stronger condition for the admissible set
of collateral D:
E
[∣∣GTUA(vA,δT )∣∣+ ∣∣λGTUB(vBT )∣∣+ ∫ T
0
∣∣gt(vA,δt , vBt , δt)∣∣ dt] <∞,(C.4)
where we now denote gt := 1δ+δE≥0g
+
t + 1δ+δE<0g
−
t and
g+t (v
A, vB, δ) :=Gt
[
hAt UA
(
vA + LA(δ − (δEt )−)
)
+ λhAt UB
(
vB − LAKt(δ − (δEt )−)
)
+ hBt
(
UA(v
A + LB(δEt )
−) + λUB(v
B − LBKt(δEt )−)
)]
,
g−t (v
A, vB, δ) :=Gt
[
hBt UA
(
vA + LB(δ + (δEt )
+)
)
+ λhBt UB
(
vB − LBKt(δ + (δEt )+)
)
+ hAt
(
UA(v
A − LA(δEt )+) + λUB(vB + LAKt(δEt )+)
)]
.
As in section 3, the first task is to characterize the optimal collateral by MOP. To this end, we
slightly modify (3.1) by merging the one terminal condition GT v
A,δ
T into dt-integral term. Observe
that Itô’s formula yields
d
(
Gtv
A,δ
t
)
= Gt
[
sA,mt δt + α
A
t − h0tvAt
]
dt+Gtv
A,δ
t φ
A
t dWt.(C.5)
If GvA,δφA ∈ H2T , the Itô’s integral term is an (P,F)-local martingale. Thus,
E
[
GT v
A,δ
T − (νA + p)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
Gt
[
sA,mt δt + α
A
t − h0tvAt
]
dt
]
.
Thus, (3.1) can be written as
max
δ∈D
E
[
(νA + p) + λGTUB(v
B
T )
+
∫ T
0
[
gt(v
A,δ
t , v
B
t , δt) +Gt(s
A,m
t δt + α
A
t − h0tvA,δt )
]
dt
]
.(C.6)
Then, we define a dynamic version of (C.6) as:
Jεt (p) := ess sup
δ∈D(t,ε)
E
[
(νA + p) + λGTUB(v
B
T )
+
∫ T
t
[
gs(v
A,δ
s , v
B
s , δs) +Gs(s
A,m
s δs + α
A
s − h0svA,δs )
]
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft].(C.7)
Then (Jεt )0≤t≤T is chosen as a càdlàg version such that for any ε ∈ D,{
Jεt +
∫ t
0
[
gs(v
A,ε
s , v
B
s , εs) +Gs(s
A,m
s εs + α
A
s − h0svA,εs )
]
ds
}
0≤t≤T
is an (P,F)-supermartingale. Moreover, for the optimal collateral δ∗ for J0,{
Jδ
∗
t +
∫ t
0
[
gs(v
A,δ∗
s , v
B
s , δ
∗
s ) +Gs(s
A,m
s δ
∗
s + α
A
s − h0svA,δ
∗
s )
]
ds
}
0≤t≤T
is an (P,F)-martingale. The detail is summarized in the following theorem. Before giving the
theorem, we introduce two notations. We separate δ from vA by denoting dv˜At = dv
A,δ
t − sA,mt δt dt,
more precisely,
v˜At =
∫ t
0
αAs ds+
∫ t
0
φAs dWs.(C.8)
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Note that v˜A0 = 0. In addition, we denote
It :=
∫ T
t
Gsh
∆
s ds.(C.9)
The optimal collateral will later be represented by (It)t≥0. This term appears in this section since
sA,m can be positive. If we consider the cost of delivering collateral, then when to default becomes
also important. However, the effect of default time can be still marginal. Recall the definition
that h∆ = h − h0. Therefore, (It)t≥0 can be understood as a correcting term of collateral for the
dependence of default times. When τA and τB are independent, we have h = h0 and I = 0.
Theorem C.1. Assume that Gh∆ is deterministic. Define
δ̂t(v˜
A
t , v
B
t ) := argmax
δ∈A
[
g˜t(v˜
A
t , v
B
t , δ) + Its
A,m
t δ
]
,(C.10)
g˜t(v
A, vB , δ) :=1δ+δE≥0g˜
+
t (v
A, vB, δ) + 1δ+δE≥0g˜
+
t (v
A, vB, δ),
g˜it(v
A, vB , δ) :=git(v
A, vB, δ) +Gt
(
sA,mt δ + α
A
t − h0t vA
)
, i ∈ {−,+}.
If δ̂(v˜A, vB) ∈ D, then (δ̂t(v˜At , v˜Bt ))0≤t≤T is a solution of (3.1).
Proof. For ε ∈ D, we define an (P,F)-semimartingale (Yt)t≥0 as
Yt :=J
ε
t − E
[ ∫ T
t
Guh
∆
u
(∫ t
0
sA,ms εs ds
)
du
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=Jεt − E
[ ∫ t
0
(∫ T
t
Guh
∆
u du
)
sA,ms εs ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=Jεt −
∫ t
0
Its
A,m
s εs ds.
Notice that Y does not depend on ε. We also define
ξεt := Yt +
∫ t
0
Its
A,m
s εs ds+
∫ t
0
[
gs(v
A,ε
s , v
B
s , εs) +Gs(s
A,m
s εs + α
A
s − h0svA,εs )
]
ds.(C.11)
To simplify (C.11), note that
gt(v
A,ε
t , v
B
t ,εt) +Gt(s
A,m
t εt + α
A
t − h0t vA,εt )
=
[
gt(v
A,ε
t , v
B
t , εt)−GthtvA,εt
]
+Gthtv
A,ε
t − h0tvA,εt +Gt(sA,mt εt + αAt )
=
[
gt(v
A,ε
t , v
B
t , εt)−GthtvA,εt
]
+Gth
∆
t v
A,ε
t +Gt(s
A,m
t εt + α
A
t ).
In addition, by Fubini’s theorem,∫ t
0
Guh
∆
u
[ ∫ u
0
sA,ms εs ds
]
du =
∫ t
0
sA,ms εs
[ ∫ t
s
Guh
∆
u du
]
ds.
Moreover,∫ t
0
Guh
∆
u v
A,ε
u du =
∫ t
0
Guh
∆
u
[
vA,εu −
∫ u
0
sA,ms εs ds
]
du+
∫ t
0
Guh
∆
u
[ ∫ u
0
sA,ms εs ds
]
du
=
∫ t
0
Guh
∆
u v˜
A
u du+
∫ t
0
sA,ms εs
[ ∫ t
s
Guh
∆
u du
]
ds,(C.12)
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and for t ≤ T ,
gt(v
A,ε
t , v
B
t , εt)−GthtvA,εt +Ghtv˜At = g(v˜At , vBt , εt).(C.13)
Therefore, (C.11) can be rewritten as
Yt +
∫ t
0
Its
A,m
s εs ds+
∫ t
0
[
gs(v
A,ε
s , v
B
s , εs) +Gs(s
A,m
s εs + α
A
s − h0svA,εs )
]
ds
=Yt +
∫ t
0
Its
A,m
s εs ds+
∫ t
0
sA,ms εs
[ ∫ t
s
Guh
∆
u du
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
(
gs(v
A,ε
s , v
B
s , εs)−GshsvA,εs +Gh∆s vAs +Gs(sA,ms εs + αAs ) ds
=Yt +
∫ t
0
Iss
A,m
s εs ds+
∫ t
0
(
gs(v˜
A
s , v
B
s , εs) +Gs(s
A,m
s εs + α
A
s − h0v˜As )
)
ds
=Yt +
∫ t
0
Iss
A,m
s εs ds+
∫ t
0
g˜s(v˜
A
s , v
B
s , εs) ds.
Then, since Y is independent of ε ∈ D, by the assumption of admissibility of δ̂(v˜A, vB), for any
ε ∈ D, we have that ξε − ξδ̂(v˜A,vB) is an (P,F)-supermartingale. It follows that for any ε ∈ D,
E
[
ξεT − ξδ̂(v˜
A,vB)
T
] ≤ E[ξε0 − ξδ̂(v˜A,vB)0 ] = 0. Then, by the admissibility, δ̂(v˜A, vB) is a solution of
(3.1).
The last step is to show δ̂(v˜A, vB) is admissible given some conditions. We consider A = R and
find the explicit form of δ̂(v˜A, vB) for the case. Then, the integrability condition is easy to check.
First, notice that g˜+, g˜− are continuously differentiable and strictly concave in δ. Thus, for any
(t, vA, vB), there exists Îit(v
A, vB), i ∈ {−,+} such that
∂δ g˜
i
t(v
A, vB, Îit(v
A, vB)) + sA,mt It = 0(C.14)
Then, it is easy to check that δ̂(v˜A, vB) is attained at I−, I+, and −δE. Observe the precise forms
of g˜i, i ∈ {−,+}, are
g˜−t (v
A, vB , δ) :=Gt
[
h∆t v
A + (hBt L
B + sA,mt )δ + α
A
t + (h
B
t L
B − hAt LA)(δEt )+
+ λhBt UB
(
vB − LBKt(δ + (δEt )+)
)
+ λUB(v
B + LAKt(δ
E
t )
+)
)]
,
g˜+t (v
A, vB , δ) :=Gt
[
h∆t v
A + (hAt L
A + sA,mt )δ + α
A
t + (h
B
t L
B − hAt LA)(δEt )−
+ λhAt UB
(
vB − LAKt(δ − (δEt )−)
)
+ λhBt UB(v
B − LBKt(δEt )−)
)]
.
Therefore, assuming hiLi > 0, i ∈ {A,B}, Ii, i ∈ {−,+}, can be explicitly represented as
Î−t (v
A, vB) =− (δEt )+ +
vB
KtLB
+
1
γBKtLB
ln
(
Gt[h
B
t L
B + sA,mt ] + s
A,m
t It
GtλγBKthBt L
B
)
,(C.15)
Î+t (v
A, vB) =(δEt )
− +
vB
KtLA
+
1
γBKtLA
ln
(
Gt[h
A
t L
A + sA,mt ] + s
A,m
t It
GtλγBKthAt L
A
)
.(C.16)
Then Theorem C.1 is completed by the next lemma. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.2, so
we omit it.
Lemma C.2. Let A = R. Assume that δE , e, Z, πi, i ∈ {A,B}, are bounded. Moreover, assume
hiLi ∈ H2T and
(G + I)sA,m
GhiLi
, i ∈ {A,B},(C.17)
are bounded. Then δ̂(v˜A, vB) ∈ D.
A RISK-SHARING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL CONTRACTS 25
Different from (3.14) and (3.15), δ̂(v˜A, vB) depends on hA and hB. As mentioned, this dependence
arises from the funding impact of sA,m, and by setting sA,m = 0, (C.15)-(C.15) are reduced to
Î−t (v
A, vB) =− (δEt )+ +
vB
KtLB
− ln (λγ
BKt)
γBKtLB
,(C.18)
Î+t (v
A, vB) =(δEt )
− +
vB
KtLA
− ln (λγ
BKt)
γBKtLA
.(C.19)
In addition, we can derive similar interpretations as in subsection 3.1. In what follows, we moreover,
assume that all parameter are constant and the default times are independent on F, i.e., I = 0.
The full collateral convention can be said that δ∗ = v − c∗ = 0 and δE = 0, dP⊗ dt-a.s. Therefore,
Ii = 0, for any t ≤ T . By (C.15) and (C.16), full collateralization requires that
vBt −
1
γB
(sA − sB)t = 1
γB
ln
( λγBhiLi
hiLi + sA,m
)
, i ∈ {A,B}, dP⊗ dt− a.s.(C.20)
In particular, (vBt − (sA − sB)t/γB)t≥0 should be constant. Thus, (C.20) implies that φB =
πB +∆B = 0, i.e., delta-hedge, and
−sBKv + φBΛBt −∆BbB −
sA − sB
γB
= 0, dP⊗ dt− a.s.(C.21)
Consider a contract such that Z 6= 0, so necessarily v 6= 0 and ∆B 6= 0. Since (C.21) should hold
for all contracts such that Z 6= 0, (C.21) implies that sB = bB = sA − sB = 0. Equivalently, by
(2.12), (2.28), sB = sA = sA,m = 0. Therefore, the margin requirement hinges on the assumption of
absence of funding impacts and delta-hedge of the Agent B. No property of the Agent A’s hedging
strategy was derived since we assumed the Agent A is risk-neutral.
Appendix D. Proofs of Lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. (i) is from the definition and (ii) is a directly obtained from (i). For
(iii), notice that B−1t et +
∫ t
0 B
−1
s dDs is an (Q,F)-local martingale. Thus, by (local) martingale
representation property, there exists Z ∈ H2,dT,loc such that for any t ≥ 0,
B−1t et +
∫ t
0
B−1s dDs =
∫ t
0
Zs dW
Q
s ,
where WQ is the Brownian motion under Q, i.e., WQt = Wt +
∫ t
0 Λs ds. Therefore, (et)t≥0 follows
the SDE:
det =rtet dt+BtZt dW
Q
t − dDt
=
(
rtet +BtZtΛt
)
dt+BtZt dWt − dDt.(D.1)
By (iii), (et)t≥0 is an F-adapted càdlàg process, but τ avoids F-stopping times. Thus, ∆eτ = 0
almost surely, equivalently eτ− = eτ a.s.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let i ∈ {A,B} and Ψ(x) := eCx for C ∈ R. It suffices to show that for
any C ∈ R, Ψ(X), Ψ(vi), are in S2T . Note that v = (BA)−1e is bounded and, by (2.26) and (2.27),
∆i and φi are also bounded. Denoting
αA :=φAΛA +∆AbA + sAv
αB :=φBΛB −∆BbB −KsBv,
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we can write dvit = α
i
t dt+ φ
i
t dWt. Applying Itô’s formula to Ψ(v
i),
dΨ(vit) =
(
Cαit + (Cφ
i
t)
2/2
)
Ψ(vit) dt+ Cφ
i
tΨ(v
i
t) dWt.(D.2)
By the assumptions, the coefficients in (D.2) are uniformly Lipsitch continuous. Thus, there exists
a unique solution of (D.2) such that
E
[
sup
t≤T
|Ψ(vit)|2
]
<∞.
In particular, Ui(v
i) ∈ S2T , so we obtain the integrability condition (2.37). It is similarly obtained
that Ψ(X) ∈ S2T . Let (Ct)t≥0 be an arbitrary bounded deterministic process. Then, we also have
exp (CX) ∈ S2T and it follow that
UA
( −γA
γBK + γA
X
)
∈ S2T
UB
(
KγA
γBK + γA
X
)
∈ S2T .
Thus, by (3.5)-(3.7), (3.14), and (3.15), we obtain δ∗(p,X) ∈ D.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Recall from (3.12) and (3.13) that
∂δf
+(t, p, x, δ) :=hAt L
A
[− γAUA(x+ LAδ) + λγBKtUB(νB − p− LAKtδ)],
∂δf
−(t, p, x, δ) :=hBt L
B
[− γAUA(x+ LBδ) + λγBKtUB(νB − p− LBKtδ)].
Let Iit(p, x) denote the function such that ∂δf
i(t, p, x, Iit (p, x)) = 0. Since f
i, i ∈ {−,+}, are
concave w.r.t δ, Ii uniquely exists. Let us denote
f˜+(t, p, x) :=max
0≤δ
f+(t, p, x, δ),
f˜−(t, p, x) :=max
δ≤0
f−(t, p, x, δ),
f˜(t, p, x) :=max
δ∈R
f(t, p, x, δ).
Then it follows that
f˜(t, p, x) :=f(t, p, x, δ∗(t, p, x)),
=f˜+(t, p, x)1f˜+(t,p,x)≥f˜−(t,p,x) + f˜
−(t, p, x)1f˜+(t,p,x)≤f˜−(t,p,x).
Thus, for finding δ∗, we should characterize the region that f˜+(t, p, x) ≥ f˜−(t, p, x). The solutions
δi, i ∈ {−,+}, of f˜ i can be found explicitly:
δ+t (p, x) =
{
0, 0 > ∂δf
+(t, p, x, 0),
I+t (p, x), 0 ≤ ∂δf+(t, p, x, 0),
δ−t (p, x) =
{
I−t (p, x), ∂δf
−(t, p, x, 0) ≤ 0,
0, 0 < ∂δf
−(t, p, x, 0).
Moreover, notice that since hi ≥ 0 and Li ≥ 0, ∂δf+(0) ∗ ∂δf−(0) ≥ 0. The rest of the proof is
merely a straightforward comparison of f˜ i in each region. In what follows, we suppress t, x, p.
(I) Let 0 ≤ ∂δf+(0) ∧ ∂δf−(0). In other words,
γAx+ γBp ≤ γBνB − ln
(
λKt
γB
γA
)
.
A RISK-SHARING FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL CONTRACTS 27
Thus, Ii ≥ 0, i ∈ {−,+}, and δ− = 0. Moreover,
f˜− − f˜+ = f−(0)− f+(I+) = f+(0)− f+(I+) ≤ 0.
Hence, δ∗ = δ+ = I+ ≥ 0.
(II) Let 0 > ∂f+(0) ∨ ∂f−(0). Then, δ+ = 0 and I− ≤ 0. Therefore, by similar calculation,
δ∗ = δ− = I− ≤ 0.
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